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The subject of Marco Stier’s article seems
to be well-known, as he addresses a promi-
nent topic in the philosophy of psychiatry:
the normative nature of mental disorders.
Of course, Stier does not attempt to cover
this issue extensively, since he focuses
rather on the Irreducibilty-Thesis (IT)
and tries to show that “psychiatric dis-
eases are irreducible to the brain even if
the mental as such may in principle be
reducible” (p. 2). Admittedly, such anti-
reductionism is not an uncontroversial
position (for an overview of the debate
see Perring, 2010, ch. 3). Here is not the
place to go into too much detail in deal-
ing with this approach, even though I
have expressed my sympathies elsewhere
(Rüther, in press). Much rather, I want to
pick out three points which, in my opin-
ion, wrongly find little or no considera-
tion. The first point concerns a position
which Stier ties to IT, namely social con-
structivism; the second point concerns the
argumentative strategy used in defending
IT. The third point finally is a general com-
ment on the orientation of the debate,
i.e., the question of what we should dis-
cuss when talking about the normativity of
mental disorders.
THE CONSTRUCTIVIST-THESIS
It is a unique feature of the text that Stier
does not stick only to the far-reaching
topic of normativity, but also makes
a connection to debates on objectivity.
He concludes that if IT is true, “psychiatric
disorders are not out there and not [to]
be understood as objectively discoverable
entities that can always be separated from
each other” (p. 8). But what are they then?
According to Stier, we are dealing with a
social construction. For, “[N]o inner feel-
ing has a sticker on it that reads “I’m a
disorder!” We have to write those stickers
ourselves and attach them to certain feel-
ings and behaviors” (p. 2, also p. 3, p. 7).
If we stick to these ideas, then it follows
that we have to understand the concept
of mental illness as non-objective or, put
positively, as a social invention. This last
thesis we may call the claim of the social
construction of mental illness (CT).
At this point a number of follow-up
questions arise, for instance, how one is to
spell out the construction metaphor and
how plausible this “spelling out” actually
is. How does Stier deal with these matters?
At times, it sounds as though Stier justifies
CT by invoking a conceptual relation to IT:
“Again, if the boundary between normality
andmental disorder is a social construction
[. . . ], then the, disorderness’ of a condi-
tion cannot be foundon - andhencenot be
reduced to - the neuronal level.” (p. 4) But
it is clear (and hardly worth mentioning)
that such a relation does not exist. In recent
years, philosophers have drawn attention
to the fact that the notions of normativity
and objectivity are different (see the locus
classicus Wiggins, 1976; McDowell, 1985,
1987). Thus, it requires separate arguments
to defend CT. In Stier, too, we find passages
in which this is acknowledged and at least
one such argument is to be found. This
argument is well-known in the debate and
starts with the descriptive assumption that
the question what mental illness happens
to be, is relative to a given context. This can
be seen in various discourses, for instance,
by researching the causes (p. 6), diagnosis
and explanation (p. 6 et seq.), or the experi-
ential quality of mental ilness (p. 7 et seq.).
However, we should recognize the follow-
ing state of affairs: It seems suspect tomake
claims about the nature ofmental illness by
referring merely to of how mental illness is
understood de facto. Empirical judgments
and judgments about the nature of mental
illness are independent of one another. A
difference that Stier explicitly concedes and
makes use of himself (see his defense of IT
below). So, perhaps we should understand
the pointer toward empirical variance in
another way, maybe not as a direct infer-
ence to CT, but as a call for explanation.
In this case, one might claim by abduction
that CT is the best explanation for the fac-
tual diversity. Indeed, we can find several
indications for such a reading, for instance,
when Stier explains the “extreme variance
of prevalence rates for, e. g., social anxiety
disorder” (p. 7) by the fact that psychia-
trists themselves definewhat an illness is by
“put[ing] up a sign that reads, Attention,
you are leaving the normal sector!′” (ibid.)
But is such an inference really persuasive?
I have doubts, in particular, because I can-
not see that theobjectivist counter-position
has a worse explanation (see e.g., Rüther,
2013, ch. 13.1). Why shouldn’t we claim
that many divergences are based on dis-
torted patterns of perception, for instance,
on psychological, semantic or logical falla-
cies? Inmost cases this would be evenmore
intuitively cogent than using the metaphor
of construction. In this manner, it seems
that the constructivist can at most achieve
an argumentative draw. Ideally, he can
offer an explanation that is comparable
in quality to that of the objectivist. But if
things are like this, doubts arise whether
thedifference-argumentforCTactuallycan
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reach its aim. The mere fact that different
beliefs about mental illness exist is not a
sufficient reason to take constructivism to
be true.
THE ARGUMENT FOR
ANTI-REDUCTIONISM
As we have seen, Stier’s main aim is to
defend IT. He writes: “All I want to show
is that mental disorders cannot be deter-
mined in a purely physical way” (p. 2).
This is not a modest aim, but rather a
highly complex one and the literature on
the topic is vast. Seen from this angle,
one might expect a detailed engagement
with proponents and opponents of IT. But
taking a closer look at the text, we get a dif-
ferent picture. For the most part, the text
points to fields and areas in which we can
assume that psychiatry carries heavy nor-
mative baggage (key words are: “frame of
reference,” “normative dimensions of psy-
chiatry”). Accordingly, the text does not,
strictly speaking, argue for IT, but offers
a description of the normative phenom-
ena at issue. Of course, this description is
also a comprehensive project, and Stier’s
extensive and sophisticated comments are
worth noting in this manner. Yet, point-
ing to our phenomenology is not sufficient
for his claim that IT is true. What we do
need is not only a description of the data,
a common ground to which reduction-
ists and non-reductions can apply their
approaches. We also need a reason that
counts against reduction. But at times,
Stier comes close to the claim that assem-
bling normative preconditions is enough.
For he speaks of the “normative bedrocks
of mental disease” (pp. 2–8) and claims
that “[i]t is in principle impossible to get
rid of this normative aspect of the task,
even if the underlying biological mecha-
nisms of a particular behavior or experi-
ence were completely known” (p. 4). In
this regard, Stier owes us a reason why
the irreducibility of the normative might
be the best explanation for the discussed
phenomenon, particularly if one takes into
account the present state of the debate
and the extensive literature on the various
counter strategies of the reductionist.
THE FOCAL POINT OF THE DEBATE
However, why should we bother with
the complicated dialectics between
reductionism and anti-reductionism in
psychiatry at all? Might it not for some
reason be sufficient to point to the nor-
mative preconditions and assume that this
is enough? Surely, for some purposes it
might be sufficient that we do not have to
get entangled in the reductionist counter
arguments. Nevertheless, I would suggest
that there is at least one reason to deal with
these arguments. This is mainly that we
can get a grip on the matter of what really
is at issue when we spell out the dialectic
between the two opponents. And if we do
so, we can see that both parties, at bottom,
are actually arguing about different con-
ceptions of how to analyse philosophical
problems. This is, of course, not a novel
conception of what the debate on reduc-
tionism is about (see e.g., Keil, 2008).
The reductionist is, at least in a common
reading, a philosopher who tries to accom-
modate the phenomena in question into a
natural framework which is mainly inves-
tigated by the natural sciences. In contrast
to that, the anti-reductionist is suspicious
about this unification and rejects this as a
vicious simplification that has unbearable
costs, e. g., it leaves something important
out or, even stronger, comes close to a
self-contradiction. Framed in this way, we
can see that the stakes are higher than we
might previously have assumed, for now
we are concerned not only with questions
internal to the philosophy of psychiatry,
but with fundamental questions about the
nature of philosophy and its methodology.
Perhaps, this background also explains
Stier’s implicit target and the intensity
with which he, and others with him, reject
reductionism. Of course, questions like
these are complicated and call for fur-
ther explanations of the terms already
used, for instance, the reductionist terms
“method,” “natural framework” or “mod-
ern science.” But in any case, it is worth
being aware that these explanations also
lead us away from the narrow philosophi-
cal context of psychiatry and point toward
a metaphilosophical reflection.
CONCLUSION
What has been said so far? First, it was
shown that Stier’s constructivist claim is
not sufficiently supported. It can nei-
ther be deduced conceptually nor is the
proposed auxiliary argument of any help.
Here we obviously need further arguments
in order to support it.
Second, it was noted that the claim
of irreducibility is explicated but not
defended. It was shown in which way nor-
mativity plays a role, but not why it resists
any form of reduction. Here one should
draw out the dialectic and hear the reduc-
tionist position.
Third, it should have become clear that
the debate on reductionism is not only a
debate specific to the philosophy of psy-
chiatry, but belongs to the wider field of
metaphilosophy. The debate about IT is,
at its core, concerned with the nature and
methods of philosophy. Thus, if one wants
to follow up on the debate about norma-
tivity in psychiatry, here might lie a field
for promising future research.
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